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Paternalistic Discrimination: The Chevron Deference
Misplaced In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal
By Tricia M. Patterson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) was
promulgated due to Congressional findings that discrimination
against individuals with disabilities is pervasive in areas such as
employment. Overprotective rules and policies 2 become the
backbone for employers in creating a paternalistic discrimination
for which a disabled person is made helpless to defend himself and
has no other recourse but to plead to the mercy of the courts.
Discrimination based on disability "often occurs under the guise of
extending a helping hand or a mistaken restrictive belief as to the
limitations of persons with disabilities." 3 However, the purpose of
the ADA was made clear: "to provide a comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities . . . [and] to invoke the sweep of congressional
authority ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities."4
* Pepperdine University School of Law, Class of 2003. I would like to
thank Hashem for making this possible, and my parents for their unconditional
love and support. This Case Note is dedicated to my grandfather, the late
Honorable Alex Kraut.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
2. Id. at § 12101(a)(5)("Individuals with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion"
through overprotective rules and policies designed to isolate and segregate those
with disabilities.)
3. Gary Phelan and Janet Bond Arterton, DISABILITY DIsCRIMINATION N
THE WORKPLACE § 7:09 (1999).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(4) (2000).
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In 2002, the Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Echazabal5 (Echazabal) made a startling announcement when it
ruled in favor of Chevron's argument that an employee, who can
perform the essential functions of his job, can be denied
employment or terminated due to his disability. The justification
for termination centers on the employer's belief that the job would
pose a "direct threat" to employees' health; yet the argument is
couched under the auspices of the "business necessity" doctrine.6
The real issue was "whether the ADA permitted the EEOC [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission] to issue regulation 29
C.F.R. section 1630.15(b), which allows employers to defend
disability discrimination charges where a person's disability would
create a direct threat to himself in the job"7 (direct threat to self).
The Court acknowledged that the ADA defines "direct threat" in
terms of risk to others," 8 yet concluded that deference should be
given to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
("EEOC") provision enhancing the ADA's definition to include an
employer's right to consider threats both to other workers and to
the employee himself.9 Language such as "may include," when
referring to qualification standard requirements, are believed by the
Court to suggest that the ADA may tolerate other standards. 10 This
belief is felt even though Congress repeatedly expressed that the
focus was a direct threat to others; the word "self' was never
mentioned. 1
This Note will explore the famed Chevron Doctrine that gives
administrative agencies a great deal of deference when interpreting
ambiguous statutes. 2 It will argue that the EEOC's interpretation
of "direct threat" was not only unreasonable and inconsistent with
the language and underlying purpose of the direct threat defense,
but that such interpretation should not have been granted because
5. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
6. Id. at 76-79.
7. Supreme Court Upholds ADA's "Threat-To-Self' Defense, ANDREWS
EMPLOYMENT LMG. REP., June 25, 2002, at 1.
8. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 78-79.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally 136 CONG. REC. S 9684-03 (1990).
12. See infra, note 24.
Congress's intent in the statute was clear and unambiguous. In
order to properly address this issue, I will first discuss the birth of
the Chevron Doctrine and what triggers its usage; second, the facts
of Echazabal that leads us to the present ruling. Third, I will
explore the Congressional intent behind the ADA statute through
the Congressional findings. Fourth, I will analyze the Supreme
Court's decision in Echazabal and will address the impact of the
Court's decision and what it means for all disabled individuals in
the workplace today.
1I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Birth of the Chevron Doctrine
1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
(Chevron) dealt with the interpretation of the term "stationary
source" as used in the Clean Air Act of 1977.13 Through The
Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress enacted requirements for
states that did not achieve the national air quality standards
established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
pursuant to earlier legislation. 4 The Clean Air Act, "both prior to
and following the Amendments, did not define the term stationary
source for purposes of measuring pollutants."'15 Those states that
had not achieved the national air quality standard were required to
establish a permit program regulating "new or modified major
stationary sources."16 The EPA regulation allowed for states to
adopt a plant-wide definition of the term "stationary sources." 17
Under this "stationary source" or "'bubble concept,' the amount of
pollution emitted by a particular facility within a plant could
13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
14. Id. at 837-38.
15. David M. Hansen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deferences to
Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 330-31 (2000).
16. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837-38 (citing the requirements of The Clean Air
Act of 1977).
17. Id.
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increase as long as the increase was offset by a concomitant
reduction in pollution emitted by one or more other facilities in the
same plant."1 8 The EPA, in turn, implemented a new rule that
stated it did not matter if the "source" was located in a non-
attainment state or not. 19 A suit was filed challenging the EPA's
definition of source and the lower court concluded that "the
legislative history bearing on the question was 'at best
contradictory. '20
In Chevron, the issue was whether the EPA's decision to allow
States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same
industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single
"bubble" hinged on a reasonable construction of the statutory term
"stationary source." 21 Because the Clean Air Act did not give a
concrete definition of what Congress had envisioned to be a
"stationary source, '"22 and this particular issue was not addressed in
the legislative history,23 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
EPA's version of the "stationary source" definition, giving birth to
the Chevron doctrine and a two part test to determine if deference
should be given to an administrative agency's decision.
2. Chevron Doctrine Two-Prong Test
By ruling in favor of the EPA's statutory interpretation of
"stationary source," the Supreme Court established a new standard
for reviewing how far an agency can go in interpreting the law.24
When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute, there
are two questions that must be addressed. The first question is
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, the statute is unambiguous
and the test concludes with the court ruling against an agency's
18. Hansen, supra note 15, at 331.
19. Id.
20. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841 (citing Natural Resources Defense Counsel,
Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 n. 39 (1982)).
21. Id. at 846-47.
22. Id. at 851-52.
23. Id.
24. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is the hallmark case for the initiation of
the Chevron Doctrine.
interpretation. 25 However, if the court determines that Congress
has not spoken on the matter or directly addressed the issue, the
agency's answer is examined to see if it is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.26 If the court finds that an agency's
interpretation is reasonable, then the court will defer; however, if
the court finds that the interpretation is not reasonable, it will then
interpret the statute.27 In Chevron, the Court found that the
interpretation by the EPA was reasonable in light of the lack of
congressional history on the subject matter.28
B. Congressional Intent of the ADA
1. The General Rule and the Prohibition of Paternalism
The ADA provides that:
(a) In general[.] It may be a defense to a charge of
discrimination under this chapter that an alleged application
of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or
benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to
be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and
such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation... (b) Qualification standards[.] The term
"qualification standards" may include a requirement that an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace. 29
In the Senate's Congressional record, the reason for Section
12113, the defense for employers, was made clear when Senator
Harkin of Iowa made the following address:
25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 481-82.
26. Id. at 843-44.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 865-66.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (2002).
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Fourth,3 ° clarifies the meaning of the defense that an
employer can fire or transfer a person who poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace. At the request of the business community the
term direct threat is defined to mean a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation. 3'
This sentiment was affirmed by Senator Kennedy when he
asserted that "[t]he ADA provides that a valid qualification
standard is that a person not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in workplace-that is, to other co-workers
or customers. 32  The Senate was not only concerned with the
safety of others, but with the unfounded fear the community may
have in letting those that are disabled to work among them.
Allowing for this defense clause in the ADA would provide an
employer with the opportunity, should a disabled individual pose a
threat to others, to deny or terminate employment. However, the
Senate duly noted that:
[T]he ADA specifically refers to health and safety threats to
others. Under the ADA, employers may not deny a person
an employment opportunity based on paternalistic concerns
regarding the person's health. . . protecting the individual
from opportunistic diseases to which the individual might
be exposed. That is a concern that should rightfully be
dealt with by the individual, in consultation with his or her
private physician. 33
Senator Kennedy's argument on paternalism is made clear:
paternalistic behavior allows for an employer's own prejudices to
30. 136 CONG. REC. § 9684-03 at S9686 (quoting Sen. Harkin: "With
respect to title I of the legislation pertaining to employment, the conference
report makes a limited number of clarifying changes to the Senate bill. These
changes were made in response to concerns raised by the business community in
order to further allay their fears about the legislation.")
31. 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03, at S9686 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at S9696.
33. Id. at S9697.
rule in favor of termination while ignoring the employee's
qualifications and ability to do the work.
2. Attempting To Escape Insurance Costs
Congress goes further, addressing the issue of employers
attempting to deny or terminate employment simply to avoid
insurance costs. Although it is recognized that people with
disabilities will have higher medical fees than others, "an employer
may not refuse to hire an applicant because of feared increase in
insurance costs . . . [I]f that could be used as a justification for
employment discrimination, however, the employment protections
of the ADA would, in practice, be more theory than reality." 34 In
raising, then dismissing this potential claim for employers,
Congress further solidifies the reason for the ADA: the disabled
should receive "not pity but respect; not shame but dignity; not
neglect but inclusion." 35
Congress also qualifies its explanation for an employers
attempt to circumvent the original intent of the ADA by discussing
the definition of subterfuge. The word subterfuge "is used in the
ADA to denote a means of evading the purposes of the ADA.,
36
The term and its meaning, as used in the ADA, are not to be
interpreted by the Ohio v. Betts standard.37 On the contrary,
Congress, not agreeing with the Supreme Court's decision and its
interpretation of subterfuge, recently reported its intention to issue
a bill to overturn the Betts decision.38 The manner of determining
whether or not an employee with a disability can or cannot handle
the requirements for work in a particular field is clear: "Those with
disabilities, including those with infectious diseases and infections,
should be judged on the basis of their qualifications and the facts
34. Id.
35. Id. at S9684.
36. Id. at S9697.
37. Id.; Cf. Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
38. Id. (recognizing that the ordinary meaning of subterfuge includes a
specific intent to circumvent or evade a statutory purpose, the Supreme Court, in
Ohio v. Betts, held there could be no such intent if the challenged provision had
been adopted prior to the statute's enactment); See also Betts, 492 U.S. at 158.
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applicable to them and not on the basis of fear, ignorance, and
prejudice. 39 Paternalistic legal interventions deliberately interfere
with a person's freedom to choose.40 Congress's intent with the
ADA left no room for interpretation or deference. The focus of the
direct threat is to others in the workplace and not the individual
with the disability. An employer may not take it upon himself to
intervene due to fear or concern for the employee in question.
III. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., v. ECHAZABAL
For twenty four years, Mario Echazabal worked at Chevron's
oil refinery in the coker unit4 1 beginning as early as 1972.42 In
1992, Echazabal applied to work for Chevron in the same capacity
at the coker unit.43 Chevron determined that he was qualified for
the position and extended him an offer contingent upon passing a
physical examination.44  Chevron's physician discovered that
Echazabal's liver was releasing certain enzymes at a higher than
normal level.45 The doctors determined that Echazabal's liver
might be damaged by exposure to the solvents and chemicals at the
refinery.46 As a result, Chevron withdrew the job offer.47
Echazabal consulted with several doctors and was eventually
diagnosed with asymptomatic, 48 chronic active hepatitis C.49
39. 136 CONG. REC. 9684-03 at S9686.
40. Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal Paternalism, 15 INT'L REV. OF LAW AND
EcONOMICS, 489 (1995).
41. A coker unit is part of the refinery that exposes employees to solvents
and chemicals.
42. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. ("Echazabal I"), 226 F.3d 1063 (9th
Cir. 2000) rev'd, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) on remand, 336 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003).
43. Id. at 1065.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. M. Persico, et al., Natural History of Hepatitis C Virus Carriers With
Persistently Normal Aminotransferase Levels, available at
http://www.natap.org/2000/april/natural-history4300.html. ("In hepatitis C virus
(HCV) patients with persistently normal alanine transaminase (ALT), the
progression rate of fibrosis is unknown.")
49. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 226 F.3d at 1065.
However, none of the physicians that Echazabal went to for
treatment encouraged Echazabal to stop working due to his medical
condition. 50 Echazabal continued to work for three more years
until 1995, when he again applied to Chevron for a position at the
coker unit.51 Tests showed the same result as before; however, this
time Chevron did not allow Echazabal to continue working at the
refinery. 52 Echazabal filed complaints with the EEOC and in state
court claiming that Chevron discriminated against him on the basis
of a disability in violation of the ADA.53 The case was removed to
federal court where the district court of California entered
summary judgment in favor of Chevron.54 Echazabal appealed and
was heard by the Ninth Circuit.55
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (1) under
the ADA, any direct threats from applicants to their health or safety
did not give an employer an affirmative defense to liability for
refusing to hire him; and (2) any risk that applicant's liver would
be damaged from further exposure to solvents and chemicals
present in refinery did not preclude him from being "otherwise
qualified" within the meaning of the ADA."56 The court further
opined that "the fact that the statute consistently defines the direct
threat defense to include only threats to others eliminates any
possibility that Congress committed a drafting error when it
omitted from the defense threats to the disabled individual
himself."57 Congressional intent appears to have been meticulously
calculated to divorce a "direct threat to self' rationale from the
wording of the statute.
Judge Trott, in his dissent, argued that Chevron was entitled to
use the "direct threat" defense because (1) Echazabal is not
otherwise qualified for the work due to the fact that it will endanger
his life; and (2) "the EEOC's relevant regulation provides that 'the
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1065.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1063.
57. Id. at 1067; Cf United States v. Garvey, 195 F.3d 1053, 1057-58 (9th
Cir 1999).
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term qualification standard may include a requirement that an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the
individual or others in the workplace."' 58  The Supreme Court
agreed and reversed the ruling, holding that the EEOC regulation
authorizing refusal to hire an individual because his performance
on the job would endanger his own health owing to a disability did
not exceed the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA. 59
IV. SUPREME COURT'S ISSUES AND HOLDING
In its review of the Echazabal case, the main issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the ADA permits a regulation by the
EEOC authorizing refusal to hire an individual because his
performance on the job would endanger his own health as a result
of a disability. 60 The issue rested on the expansion of the ADA's
"direct threat" language originating in the statute.6 1 The lower
court agreed with the argument that the ADA did not explicitly
state that the right to bar an employee with a disability is affirmed
when they pose a direct threat to themselves in the workplace. 62
However, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held that the
EEOC regulation did not exceed the scope of permissible
rulemaking under the ADA "[s]ince Congress has not spoken
exhaustively on threats to a worker's own health, the agency
regulation can claim adherence under the rule in Chevron."63
V. COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Court addressed the "job-related and consistent with
business necessity" 64 provision in the ADA, concluding that
Congress left "spacious defensive categories, which seem to give
an agency (or in the absence of agency action, a court) a good deal
58. Id. at 1074 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2)).
59. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 73.
60. Id. at 2047.
61. Id. at 2048.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 82-85 (referencing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
64. Id. at 78-80 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000)).
of discretion in setting the limits of permissible qualification
standards." 65  The Court qualified its reasoning, stating that
discretion is heightened because "'qualification standards' may
include a direct threat to others in the workplace." Direct threats
fall within the limits of job relation and business necessity.66 The
Court's phrasing "may include," removed the focus from others in
the workplace, and included employees within the qualification
standards.67
The Court also did not find that the language in the ADA
completely excludes the disabled employee from among those that
can suffer a direct harm as a result of the disability.68 The failure,
in this case, "to identify any such established series, including both
threats to others and threats to self, from which Congress appears
to have made a deliberate choice to omit the latter item as a signal
of the affirmative defense's scope," is another reason why the
Court ruled against Echazabal.69 Echazabal used the EEOC's rule
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that defined the
qualified individual with a handicap as a person who would pose a
"direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals. 7 °
Although neither The Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA says
anything about the direct threat to the handicapped employee, the
Court believes that this does not conclude that the ADA
deliberately omitted direct threat to self.7' The Court reasoned that
"[w]hile the EEOC did amplify upon the text of the Rehabilitation
Act exclusion by recognizing threats to self along with threats to
others, three other agencies adopting regulations under the
Rehabilitation Act did not.72
The Court further reasoned that the EEOC's regulation is
entitled to survive because the risk of exposing Echazabal to health
65. Id. at 80-82.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000)).
71. Id.
72. Id. (See 28 C.F.R. § 42.50 (1)(1) (1990) (Department of Justice); 29 CFR
§ 32.3 (1990) (Department of Labor), and 45 C.F.R. § 84.(k)(1) (1990)
(Department of Health and Human Services)).
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hazards violate the national Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSHA).73  The OSHA text makes references to the
obligation of the employer to "furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees. 74  Under this theory,
Section 651(b) of the Act calling for "every working man and
woman in the Nation [to have] safe and healthful working
conditions" 75 would mean that Chevron's decision in terminating
Echazabal's employment due to direct risk of health would be
justifiable. Additionally, these competing objectives put employers
at risk by hiring a disabled individual under the ADA yet is
contrary to the OSHA policy. 76 This argument shows that the
EEOC can be called upon at times to make substantive choices that
is the best interest of the disabled person especially when Congress
"leaves the intersection of competing objectives both imprecisely
marked but subject to the administrative leeway found in 42
Section U.S.C. 12113(a). 77
In addressing the area of paternalism, the Court recognized the
EEOC's regulation in disallowing that sort of stereotype. 78 Current
medical knowledge is one of many factors viewed in light of the
risk and severity of the harm to an employee in the workplace.79
As a result, the Court reasoned that the EEOC was acting within a
reasonable zone by rejecting paternalism and refusing to ignore
"specific and documented risks to the employee himself, even if
the employee would take his chances for the sake of getting a job.81
Also, when the Court expressed its disfavor for Echazabal's
argument that legislative history runs counter to the EEOC's
regulation, the Court emphasized that paternalism, as discussed in
the hearings, focused more on the misperceptions of individuals
73. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84-85.
74. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970)).
75. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1970)).
76. Id.
77. Id.; See also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
about disability rather than general terms.8  The Court also raised
the concern that the lower court's decision conflicted with both an
Eleventh Circuit and a Seventh Circuit case. 82  Both cases are
addressed below.
1. Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc. 83
The issue in Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc. was whether
an employer can use the ADA as a means to keep an employee
from working a job that he his capable of currently doing, but will,
sometime in the future, be unable to do as a result of a
disabilitating disease that will become increasingly worse over
time.84 The court was faced with two competing interests: (1) the
employer's interest in protecting its employees from harmful
injuries while protecting itself from any liabilities; and (2) the
disabled employee's interest in maintaining quality of life by
earning a living while he or she is still able.85 In 1995, Koshinski
experienced pain in his left wrist.86  After seeing his personal
physician, further tests showed he had "'non-occupational'.
degenerative osteoarthritis."8 7  As time progressed, further tests
were done and it was determined that his grip strength had become
increasingly worse. 88 A final test was done and it was concluded
that due to deterioration in his grip strength he was no longer able
to perform the necessary functions of his job as a cupola operator. 89
Working a cupola required Koshinski to:
operate a pneumatic hammer and chisel, a pressurized water
hose, various hand tools, a hand joist, fork truck and
81. Id. at note 5.
82. Id. at 76-77.
83. Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 600.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 601.
88. Id. At 600-01.
89. Id. at 601 ("A cupola is a cylindrical shaft blast furnace for re-melting..
* iron before casting. Id. at 600 (referencing Webster's II New Riverside
University Dictionary 336 (1994)).
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bobcat, he had to go up and down a chain ladder, lift 80 to
100lb. bags and boxes, lift slabs and bricks into overhead
position and pound them into place with a hammer or
mallet, and paint and shovel. 90
Evidence pointed to the conclusion that Koshinski had
"Kienbock's Disease" 91 and could no longer perform the essential
functions of his job.92 Koshinski had also told the Social Security
Administration that: "If I pick up something heavy left wri[s]t
hurts," 93 and admitted at his deposition that "he was incapable of
meeting the rigorous demands of the cupola operator position."
94
To qualify for protection under the ADA, Koshinski had to show
that he was "a qualified individual with a disability [and] that 'with
or without reasonable accommodation, he can perform the essential
functions of the employment.' 95  The District Court held that
Koshinski could not show that he was entitled to protection under
the ADA and the record clearly showed that he could no longer
perform the essential functions of his job.96
2. Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc.
97
In Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., summary judgment
was affirmed where an American Nonwovens' (American)
employee Mark Moses, suffered from epilepsy. 98  Moses' job
required him to work near fast-moving press rollers and conveyer
belts.99 Because he was a web operator, he would sit underneath a
90. Id.
91. Kienbock's Disease is a disease that causes "the lunate (the small bone
in the wrist) to collapse," causing pain and decreased movement of the wrist. Id.
at 601.
92. Id. at 602.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 603.
95. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1997)).
96. Id. at 603.
97. Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
98. Id. at 447.
99. Id.
conveyer belt with in-running pinch-points.'0 0 He was also a hot
splicer assistant where he worked next to exposed machinery that
reached temperatures of 350 degrees Fahrenheit. 01  American
knew "he was taking medication for his epilepsy but that his
medication was not controlling his seizures." Moses was
subsequently fired. 10 2 Moses brought suit against his employers
alleging that he was fired in violation of the ADA as a result of his
disability. 10 3 The court ruled that Moses failed to show that 1) he
was not a direct threat to his own health or safety and 2) he still
was able perform his duties if reasonable accommodations were
available. 04 The court focused on the EEOC's additional language
of the "direct threat to self,"'1 5 concluding that Moses failed to
prove he was not a direct threat, that Moses' job duties presented
great risks to an employee with seizures, and that Moses did not
show that any reasonable accommodations would prove
effective.' 016 The court duly noted, however, that the employer
failed to investigate possible accommodations, which was in
violation of the EEOC.10 7
VI. AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS
The Chevron Doctrine calls for a lack of clear Congressional
intent in order for an administrative agency to receive deference in
its interpretation. 0 8 Justice Stevens suggested that courts should
defer to reasonable agency interpretations. Stevens reasoned that
Congress explicitly or implicitly delegates power to administrative
agencies to fill gaps in ambiguous statutes. 10 9 The operative word
is ambiguous. The Congressional Record clears up Congress's
100. Id.
101. Id. at 448.
102 Id.
103. Id. at 447.
104. Id. at 448.
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1990).
106. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d at 447-48.
107. Id. at 448; See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r) (1990); 1630.9, Interp.
Guidance.
108. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-46.
109. Id.
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reason for the ADA and its primary focus: "The conferees
reaffirmed the basic precept of the legislation that persons with
disabilities, including those with infectious diseases and infections,
should be judged on the basis of their qualifications and the facts
applicable to them."11  Moreover, the debate as to whether
Congress intended the "direct threat to others" provision to include
a direct threat to self also seems to have been raised and dismissed
by the language of direct threat defense plainly expressing
"Congress's intent to include within the scope of a section 12113
defense only threats to other individuals in the workplace." '' This
raises concerns as to the EEOC's expansion of the ADA's
regulation and why the Chevron Doctrine was administered in the
first place.
The EEOC's expansion of the ADA's "direct threat" provision
in its regulation far exceeds the scope and intent of Congress and
their purpose for the ADA.1 12 According to the Congressional
records, direct threat was never meant to include the direct threat of
the disabled employee. 1 3 This issue was raised and dismissed by
Congress stating that "[e]mployers may not deny a person an
employment opportunity based on paternalistic concerns regarding
the person's health."'114 It has been determined that "paternalistic
attitudes and beliefs are the principal causes of disability
discrimination."1 15 The ADA was specifically designed to prevent
this type of implementation. 116 The Supreme Court has rejected
this view by overlooking the Congressional talks and affirming the
EEOC's decision to insert words that is contrary to the ADA
statutory language. 117
The first section of analysis, Part VII (A), describes how the
use of the Chevron Doctrine in deferring to the EEOC' s addition of
threat to self was misplaced due to the unambiguous language and
110. 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03 at S9686.
111. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 at 1068.
112. Id. at 1069.
113. See generally 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03.
114. Id. at S9697.
115. Sedey, infra note 175.
116. Id.
117. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 73-74.
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clear intent of Congress as to the motive and aim of the ADA. If
this is the case, the Court should never have ruled in favor of
Chevron under a "threat to self' theory. The remaining sections,
Parts VII (B)-(D), will illustrate how the EEOC exceeded its scope
of permissible rulemaking by interpreting the statute language in a
paternalistic fashion, thus harming the disabled and running
contrary to the expressed intent of Congress. This note will
distinguish the Echazabal case from Koshinski and Moses to show
that there is no factual support for the Ninth Circuit consideration
of Echazabal, and will discuss the OSHA red herring. The final
section, Part VII (E), addresses the concerns of the impact the
Court's decision will now have for the disabled community.
VII. ANALYSIS
A. The Chevron Doctrine Was Misplaced in Echazabal because
There Was Clear Congressional Intent
The Chevron doctrine was never intended to give agencies
unfettered discretion to interpret regulatory provisions 1 8 or to take
away the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.119
This is confirmed by the doctrine's limiting mechanism on when it
can be applied by proof of unclear congressional intent.120 If a
closer reading of the statutory term under the "plain meaning" of
Congress rings true, this puts limits on both the courts and the
agencies in terms of when they may intervene to decide what
Congress had in mind.
The Chevron Doctrine is applied using a two-step process:
"First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
118. See Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 Mo. L. REV.
129, 138 (1993).
119. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 37 (1803) (holding that the
Supreme Court lacked the power to order the Secretary of State to deliver
judicial commissions) (Marshall, J.).
120. Unless there is lack of congressional intent or ambiguity in the statute,
neither agencies nor courts can make changes contrary to what Congress has
spoken to.
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agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."' 121 Only if this question is answered in the negative, the
analysis moves to its second step:
If, however, the court determines that Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.122
Most courts reach their decision by focusing solely on step one
of the Chevron analysis because if congressional intent is found for
a statute that is clear and unambiguous, the second step is
unnecessary. 123 If the court decides that the statute was in fact
ambiguous and an administrative agency makes an interpretation of
the statute, "the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute . . .
[without] substitut[ing] its own construction of the statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation by the administrator of an
agency."1 24
In Echazabal, neither unclear congressional intent nor an
ambiguous statute was present. It can be perceived that Congress
intentionally left a direct threat to self rationale out of the statute in
an attempt to reinforce the goal and motivation behind enacting the
ADA. 125 Facially, the provision does not include a direct threat to
the disabled individual. By specifying that only those threats to
121. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
122. Id. at 843 (citations omitted).
123. Id; See also Bruce Fein, Agency Discretion Unwisely Limited in
'Dimension', LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1986.
124. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
125. Echazabal 1, 226 F.3d at 1066 (Judge Reinhardt for the Ninth Circuit
arguing that "the fact that the statute consistently defines the direct threat
defense to include only threats to others eliminates any possibilities that
Congress committed a drafting error when it omitted from the defense threats to
the disabled individual himself.").
other individuals in the workplace are to be included as a defense,
Congress confirms that "the term direct threat means a significant
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodations."12 6  Moreover, the congressional
record supports the singular "threat to others" standard, clearly
omitting any drafting errors on the part of Congress. The
congressional record reiterates the purpose of the "direct threat"
language as one that focuses on the other employees in the
workplace and not the disabled themselves.' 27 The fact that the
words "may include" should change the definition to somehow
allow for additional words to be added such as "the individual,"
finds no reasoning within congressional record, on point. 128
Senator Kennedy, believing that "we have worked out a good
resolution" 129 raised the issue of significant risks and stated that:
[A] specific decision was made to state clearly in the statute
that, as a defense, an employer could prove that an
applicant or employee posed a significant risk to the health
of safety of others . . . it is important, however, that the
ADA specifically refers to the health and safety threats of
others. 130
This argument focused on the paternalistic concerns that an
employer might have against a disabled employee. Noting that
"[t]his is a concern that should rightfully be dealt with by the
individual, in consultation with his or her private physician,"131
shows that Congress's intent to divorce a direct threat to self was
126. Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. ("Echazabal III"), 336 F.3d 1023
(9th Cir. 2003) (referencing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b)).
127. Echazabal I, 226 F.3d at 1066; See also 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03.
128. The EEOC argues that the words "may include" invites a modification
from the original definition.
129. 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03 at S9686.
130. Id. at S9687.
131. Id.; See also Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 273-74 (1987) (involving an action brought by school teacher alleging that
her dismissal due to tuberculosis susceptibility violated the Rehabilitation Act.
Teachers afflicted with tuberculosis were held by the Court to be "handicapped
individuals" within the meaning of the Act and, as a result, discrimination was a
violation).
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clearly realized in the record. The statute was not ambiguous,
unclear, nor silent to this fact.
In addition to Congressional intent, the legislative history of the
ADA proves conclusively that a direct threat to self does not apply.
In the House of Representatives Conference Reports, the term
"direct threat" is used repeatedly. 132  Not once is the term
synonymous with a direct threat to oneself.133 The term is used to
refer to others in the workplace with no references being made that
the threat is also to the disabled individual. 134 For the Chevron
Doctrine to be triggered, a statute must show a lack of clear
congressional intent or silence on the issue. 35 Neither one is
present in the ADA, therefore, the Chevron Doctrine was
misplaced in Echazabal.
B. The EEOC Exceeded the Scope of Permissible Rulemaking
under the ADA and Lends to Paternalism
The EEOC's regulations interpreting the statutory term that the
qualification standard may include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a threat to the health or safety of the individual or
others in the workplace exceeded the scope of permissible
rulemaking under the ADA because it conflicts with the plain
meaning of the statute and with congressional intent. In Federal
Elections Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign,136 a
pre-Chevron case, the court held that an agency interpretation
could be overturned if it was contrary to clear congressional intent
or because it frustrated the policy that Congress sought to
implement. 137 The EEOC exceeded its scope of permissible
rulemaking because the language of the provision does not provide
for an alternative to a "direct threat to others" reading. Congress
almost unanimously' 38 supports "a direct threat to the health and
132. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 57, 60, 77, 84 (1990).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
136. Federal Elections Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign,
660 F.2d 773 (1980) rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
137. Id. at 782.
138. See 136 CONG. REC., S9684 at S9695 (voting 91 yeas, 6 nays).
safety of other individuals in the workplace,"' 39 even specifying
co-workers and customers. The additional language not only
changes the meaning of the statute and the reason it was
implemented in the first place, but it also gives way to paternalistic
concerns and a type of indirect discrimination that has only one
goal: to keep the disabled ostracized from the society and the
workplace. By frustrating Congress's policy and its purpose of the
ADA, the EEOC's additional "direct threat to self' language has
exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking.
With regards to federal statutes, Title VII has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court to similarly outlaw paternalistic employment
policies. For example, in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 140 the
Supreme Court held that respondents could not exclude women
with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs regardless of the
potential harm to their reproductive health and their unborn
children. 141 Potential health issues did not justify the employer's
decision to exclude women from positions at a battery
manufacturing plant. 142 On the contrary, the Court left the decision
of whether to accept the risk of employment to the individual.
43
Based on the facts above, it can be concluded that Congress
intended to extend the freedom of choice given to Title VII
plaintiffs to the disabled as well.
Paternalistic attitudes and beliefs are the principal causes of
disability discrimination. Discrimination on the basis of disability
"often occurs under the guise of extending a helping hand or a
mistaken restrictive belief as to the limitations of persons with
disabilities." 144 A regulation which enables employers to deny
employment because a disability might threaten the individual's
health or safety could encourage the paternalistic belief that the
ADA was designed to eradicate. The direct threat defense cannot
be based on an assumption to injuries or harms the employee
139. Id. at S9697.
140. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 206.
144. Gary Phelan and Janet Bond Arterton, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN
THE WORKPLACE § 7:09 (1999).
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would probably or may likely face. The statute and case law leave
that choice to the disabled and his or her private physician. 1 45
C. The Cases of Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., and Moses v.
American Nonwovens, Inc., are Distinguishable from the
Echazabal Case, and Should Not Have Been Raised by the Court.
Koshinski is distinguished from Echazabal because, unlike
Echazabal, Koshinski could no longer perform the essential
functions of his job due to his disability. Koshinski's disability
caused the use of his hand, which was needed to perform the basic
essentials of his job, to deteriorate, and, according to medical
examinations, "needs some permanent accommodation in the work
place if possible ... no exposure to vibration, no high force/high
frequency repetitive tasks."' 46  Unfortunately, Koshinski's job
required operation of: a pneumatic hammer and chisel, a
pressurized water hose, and various hand tools. Koshinski's job
also required him to go up and down a chain ladder, lift heavy
bags, paint, and shovel. 14 7  Koshinski himself believed that he
could no longer perform the work according to deposition
testimony, "If I pick up something heavy left wrist hurts.
swells," and stated to a physician that he was experiencing
"constant pain with use. . . 'nothing' could relieve the pain."' 148 He
finally admitted that he could not meet the demands of his job. 149
Moses and Koshinki are distinguishable from Echazabal
because neither Echazabal nor his doctors believed that his
disability prevented him from performing the essential functions of
his job.150 Not once did Echazabal claim to be in pain so severe
that he could no longer meet the demands of his job.151 On the
contrary, the facts in Koshinski are in stark contrast to Echazabal
for three reasons: (1) Echazabal's disability did not render him
145. 136 CONG. REc. at S9697.
146. Koshinski, 177 F.3d 599 at 601.
147. Id. at 602.
148. Id. at 600.
149. Id. at 602.
150. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 76-77.
151. Id.
incapable of performing the job's day to day functions; and (2) his
private physicians repeatedly tested him and concluded that he
should not stop working at the refinery because of his medical
condition; 152 and (3) his disability did not stop Chevron from
offering him a permanent position in the coker unit when they were
already put on notice of his ailments years prior, 153 because he did
in fact meet the demands of his job to their obvious satisfaction.
The problem with the Court's holding in Moses is that it gives
no basis for its decision, and hence, no guidance for a complete and
thorough analysis. 154 Additionally, although "American admits
that it fired Moses because of his epilepsy ... Moses does not deny
that there was a significant risk that if he had continued working at
American, he would have had seizures on the job."'155 Unlike
Echazabal, Moses admitted that his seizures did in fact pose a
problem in the workplace. 156 Because his job required him to work
directly with fast-moving press rollers and machines that reached
temperatures of 350 degrees Fahrenheit, epileptic seizures had the
potential of posing harm to others around him. 157 Although a
"direct threat to others" argument was not mentioned in this case,
the issues presented were (1) whether Moses produced evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he was not a
direct threat "or" (2) that reasonable accommodations were
available. 158
Echazabal proved he was not a direct threat to others or himself
in the workplace by presenting evidence showing that "two
medical witnesses disputed Chevron's judgment that Echazabal's
liver function was impaired and subject to further damage under
the job conditions in the refinery."' 59 This evidence was ignored.
The Court does mention that a reasonable accommodations
argument was not raised by Echazabal, however, the EEOC advises
152. Echazabal 1, 226 F.3d at 1065.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1066.
155. Moses, 97 F. 3d at 447.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 447-48.
158. Id. at 447.
159. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 76-77.
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employers to "determine whether a reasonable accommodation
would . . . eliminate the direct threat."' 160 Facts are silent as to
whether this ever took place. However, the most compelling
argument in Echazabal's favor is that he worked for Chevron in the
coker unit for 24 years prior to being terminated; this includes an
extra three years after Chevron first became aware of his condition
and failed to take any action at that time.
Both Koshinski and Moses show that the plaintiffs were aware
that their conditions prevented them from performing the essential
functions of their job. Echazabal, for twenty-three years continued
to provide Chevron with quality work that resulted in two job
offers from the company. These cases are distinguished from the
Echazabal case and should not have been raised by the Court as
examples.
D. An OHSA Regulation Should Not Be Used to Subterfuge an
Employer's Discrimination of a Disabled Employee
Although the text of OSHA's purpose is "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions,"' 6 1 it was not designed to aid an
employer's paternalistic behavior. The Supreme Court reads this
passage to conclude hiring an individual who knowingly consented
to the particular dangers a job would pose to him would render the
employer liable under OSHA. 162 Whether an employer would be
liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who knowingly
consented to particular dangers his or her job may impose still
remains an open question.' 63 However, it is common knowledge
that OSHA is comprised of a series of requirements that an
employer must comply with in order to maintain healthful work
conditions for the employee. 164 For example, OSHA encourages
160. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r) (2000); 1630.9, Interp. Guidance.
161. 29 U.S.C.A. § 65 1(b) (2000).
162. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84-85.
163. Id.
164. U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health
Administration, OSHA Act of 1970 Congressional Findings and Purpose,
available at
employers and employees to reduce safety and health hazards by
"institut[ing] new and to perfect existing programs for providing
safe and healthful working conditions."' 65 Also, it provides for
"training programs to increase the number and competence of
personnel engaged in the field of occupational safety and
health."' 166  Moreover, regulations include such things as:
"encouraging joint labor-management efforts to reduce injuries and
disease arising out of employment," "exploring ways to discover
latent diseases," and providing medical criteria which will assure
that no employee will suffer diminished health as a result of his
work experience. 167 However, none of the regulations allude to
termination of employment as a result of a disability stemming
from work conditions.' 68
The author finds no competing interests against the ADA and
OSHA in this case. Raising OSHA as a defense was not
reasonable because Chevron should not have been allowed to place
its interest in avoiding time lost to sickness and excessive turnover
from medical retirement or death as a reason to raise the
argument. 169 Litigation under state tort law as a result of an OSHA
violation is not a valid excuse. 170 The Court rejected this view,
finding that:
[T]here is no denying that the employer would be asking
for trouble: his decision to hire would put Congress's policy
in the ADA, a disabled individual's right to operate on
equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the
competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of each
and every worker. 171
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=OSHACT
&p-id=28.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84-85.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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However, Congress did not create a competing interest with
respect to the ADA's direct threat to others and OSHA's providing
a workplace free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or
serious harm to their employee. One Act is concerned with the
threat posed by one employee to another, while the other Act is
concerned with safety conditions in the workplace that should be
remedied to avoid health concerns to all employees.
OSHA also requires that "all occupational illnesses must be
recorded regardless of the severity."'17 2 However, the record is
silent as to whether Chevron ever contacted OSHA after their
doctors first tested Echazabal and discovered that his disability is
irritated by the toxic fumes present at work. Assuming they did,
Echazabal was never terminated from his job. Echazabal also
raises an issue that should be taken into greater consideration:
"there is no known instance of OSHA enforcement, or even
threatened enforcement, against an employer who relied on the
ADA to hire a worker willing to accept a risk to himself from his
disability on the job."1 73  OSHA appears to focus more on
preventative measures and procedures for safe and healthful
working conditions in the workplace, than terminating one's
employment due to exacerbated health conditions.
E. The Impact of the Echazabal Decision
The Supreme Court's ruling will make it difficult for the
disabled to ever maintain or sustain employment. By deferring to
the EEOC regulation that direct threat to self is a reasonable
interpretation of Congresss' intent, "the EEOC regulation will
undoubtedly give rise to protracted litigation in this area." 174 In
addition to paternalistic discrimination having the potential of
becoming uncontrollable within the workplace, another type of
discrimination will be added to society's growing list as a result of
172. See generally Bernard L. Erven and Eric E. Barrett, OSHA: The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, at http://www-agecon.ag.ohio-
state.edu/resources/docs/abstract.cfm?DoclD=29 1.
173. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84-85.
174. Mary Anne Sedey, The Threat to Safety Defense Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 96, 96 (1992).
this ruling: genetic discrimination. 7 5 Concerns regarding genetic
discrimination have already been raised and the argument is a
similar one:
[G]enetic information is, in fact, predictive, but
nevertheless we still shouldn't allow employers to use
genetic information because it violates some public policy.
I think an analog would be the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. Pregnant applicants for employment clearly are more
likely, at some point in the future, to request leave from
work and therefore represent an increased cost to
employers. But we say for policy reasons that employers
still can't use pregnancy as a basis for discrimination.176
Similarly, the Supreme Court has also ruled in the past that
pregnancy discrimination is unacceptable where danger of
exposing toxins to an unborn fetus resulted in terminating a
pregnant employee. The Court held that it was up to the employee,
to decide whether to accept the risk.' 77 Echazabal faithfully
worked as Chevron's employee for twenty years without incident.
The choice and risk, if there is one, should rightfully be left up to
Echazabal and his personal physicians, the way Congress intended
it.
By overturning Echazabal, Congress's vision of "bring[ing]
forty-three million Americans with disabilities under the protection
175. A 2002 bill has already been introduced discussing the harm of
insurance discrimination as a result of genetic testing on potential applicants for
employment. Employers can learn about an employee's genetic information
through company medical exams and use the information for the purposes of not
hiring a qualified employee. New concerns have been raised in the area of
employment discrimination. There is a fear that "the erroneous assumption that
if an individual has a certain genetic makeup, that he or she is likely to get a
certain illness and will be unable to perform the job." See infra note 171, at 70;
See also Enzi Introduces Bill to Prevent Genetic Discrimination, available at
http://www.senate.gov/-enzi/gendis.htm.
176. Cynthia Nance et al., Discrimination in Employment on the Basis of
Genetics: Proceedings of the 2002 Annual Meeting, Association of American
Law Schools Section on Employment Discrimination Law, 6 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 57, 69-70 (2002).
177. See supra note 139.
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of our Constitution" 178 will become a reality. After all, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "put into place a framework for equal
opportunity in the workplace,"'1 79  and "Title I of the ADA is
patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act."'180 The potential
for Echazabal to be overturned seems likely because "the case has
been sent back to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether the
company's decision not to hire Echazabal was based on.
'reasonable medical judgment'.' Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
has a tendency "to rule against employers."' 82  By allowing
employers to deny an individual employment because of a
disability will threaten the very framework of all discrimination
cases that have been held to the contrary and run counter to
protective legislation that focus on rights for the disabled. If
Echazabal is overturned, "antidiscrimination and workplace safety
legislation [will continue to] exemplify the liberal postwar
American mind set: to utilize the regulator power of government to
protect and secure the rights of all citizens, particularly in
situations where they could be exploited by powerful and
conservative economic or social interests."
1 83
VIII. CONCLUSION
There was no need to defer to the EEOC's regulation in this
case. One commentator stated that, "Chevron made agency
interpretations binding and gave them force of law." 184
However, the Chevron deference establishes a formal test that
178. 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03 at S9697.
179. Judith Richter, Taking the Worker As You Find Him, 8 MD. J. OF
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 189 (1997).
180. Phelan, supra note 145.
181. Greenebaum Doll, McDonald, High Court Tells Worker: 'This Is For
Your Own Good' 12 No. 11 KY. EMP. L. LETTER 7 (explaining that the Court
reasoned that in order for the defense to be used as crafted in the regulations, it
must be based on a "reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current
medical knowledge.").
182. Id.
183. Richter, supra note 180, at 190.
184. Weaver, supra note 119, at 135 (citing Robert A. Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Bind the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 (1990).
should only be administered in the event that Congress has not
spoken on the matter or has explicitly delegated the authority to an
agency of expertise. The validity of the test has nothing to do with
whether or not invoking it would be a good idea for the health and
safety of the disabled individual, but gives deference only in
situations where Congress did not address the issue. The ADA
makes clear the language in the statute that addresses qualifications
standards that include a requirement that an individual not pose a
direct threat to the health and safety of others in the workplace.
There is no mistaking Congress's intent not to allow paternalistic
views to overshadow the reason and purpose of the ADA to
prevent discrimination in the workplace against individuals who
are disabled but can still perform the essential functions of the job.
The Chevron doctrine simply was not applicable here.
Today, we say "no" to second class citizenship for people with
disabilities, "no" to segregation, isolation, and exclusion, and "no"
to patronizing attitudes. Today we say "yes" to treating people
with disabilities with dignity and respect, "yes" to empowerment,
and "yes" to judging people on the basis of their abilities, not on
the basis of fear, ignorance, and prejudice.' 85
185 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03 at S9697.
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